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Nature of Blame in Patient Safety Incident Reports: 
Mixed Methods Analysis of a National Database
ABSTRACT
PURPOSE A culture of blame and fear of retribution are recognized barriers 
to reporting patient safety incidents. The extent of blame attribution in safety 
incident reports, which may reflect the underlying safety culture of health care 
systems, is unknown. This study set out to explore the nature of blame in family 
practice safety incident reports.
METHODS We characterized a random sample of family practice patient safety 
incident reports from the England and Wales National Reporting and Learning 
System. Reports were analyzed according to prespecified classification systems to 
describe the incident type, contributory factors, outcomes, and severity of harm. 
We developed a taxonomy of blame attribution, and we then used descriptive 
statistical analyses to identify the proportions of blame types and to explore 
associations between incident characteristics and one type of blame.
RESULTS Health care professionals making family practice incident reports attrib-
uted blame to a person in 45% of cases (n = 975 of 2,148; 95% CI, 43%-47%). 
In 36% of cases, those who reported the incidents attributed fault to another 
person, whereas 2% of those reporting acknowledged personal responsibil-
ity. Blame was commonly associated with incidents where a complaint was 
anticipated.
CONCLUSIONS The high frequency of blame in these safety, incident reports may 
reflect a health care culture that leads to blame and retribution, rather than to 
identifying areas for learning and improvement, and a failure to appreciate the 
contribution of system factors in others’ behavior. Successful improvement in 
patient safety through the analysis of incident reports is unlikely without achiev-
ing a blame-free culture.
Ann Fam Med 2017;15:455-461. https://doi.org/10.1370/afm.2123.
INTRODUCTION
In the international agenda for patient safety, incident reporting sys-tems are critical engines for learning.1,2 For those who report safety incidents, however, fear of blame is a recognized barrier in all safety-
critical industries that seek to use the analysis of incidents as a method for 
improvement.1-7 The extent of blame attribution within incident reports 
themselves is unknown. Underreporting is the norm, and it has been 
estimated that reporting systems detect only 10% of adverse events in 
hospitals.8 Such underreporting represents a major missed opportunity to 
understand errors and prevent harm.
The patient safety movement is based on the premise that patient 
safety incidents are largely the result of poorly designed systems.9 Even 
so, our previous study of primary care incident reports suggests that those 
who report such incidents focus heavily on describing the shortcomings 
of the individuals (staff, patients, families, caregivers) involved without 
considering system failings.10 In a minority of situations, where there is 
willful misconduct or negligence, it is appropriate that individual account-
ability should be enforced.11 The political and media climates in many 
countries, however, too often demand that individuals are held responsible 
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regardless of the reason.1,12,13 Where there is blame and 
finger-pointing, the opportunity for shedding light on 
the real explanation for serious incidents is lost. Fear of 
blame is a major barrier to both participation in inci-
dent reporting and to promoting an underlying safety 
culture in health systems.1,6
Most patient safety studies have been in hospital 
populations, yet globally, primary care manages up to 
90% of all patient contacts.14 Primary care lags behind 
secondary care in generating learning from incident 
reports15 and has additional challenges when it comes 
to reporting patient safety concerns. For example, a 
report on whistle-blowing in a family practice empha-
sized how difficult it is to report confidentially or 
anonymously when working in small clinical teams.16 In 
addition, a potential immediate employer may be per-
sonally involved in the safety incident. Accordingly, we 
set out to examine a sample of patient safety incidents 
reported from primary health care settings within a 
publicly funded health care system. The aim of our 
study was to identify and classify the types of state-
ments of attributed blame made within the reports and 
to relate them to the nature of the incidents.
METHODS
Data Source
We analyzed data taken from the National Reporting 
and Learning System, a database of 14 million patient 
safety incident reports from England and Wales. A 
patient safety incident was defined as “any unintended 
or unexpected incident that could have harmed or did 
harm a patient during healthcare delivery.”17 Report-
ing incidents started on a voluntary basis in 2003, 
but since 2010, reporting has been mandatory for 
incidents resulting in severe harm or death. Reports 
contained structured categorical information about 
care setting, patient demographics, and the perception 
of severity of harm, as well as free-text descriptions 
of the incident, apparent causes, and planned actions 
to prevent recurrence. The database is described in 
more detail in a study of patient safety-related hospital 
deaths in England.13
Study Population
We included reports if they related to the provision 
of primary health care in England and Wales and 
were not duplicates. In accordance with the National 
Academy of Medicine definition of primary care, we 
also included community health care reports, includ-
ing those from community-based nursing and mental 
health care services.18 Our study period, which was 
April 2005 to September 2013 (42,729 reports submit-
ted during this period), was dictated by data avail-
ability at the study outset. We combined all reports of 
severe harm and death (1,199 reports) with a weighted 
random sample of incident reports of lower harm 
severity (12,500) to create a sampling frame of 13,699 
reports. The weighting gave greater priority to more 
recent reports. We described the sampling frame in 
more detail elsewhere.19
Sample Size
In a pilot study of 857 patient safety incident reports, 
we found blame descriptions in 47% (401). To estimate 
the true proportion of blame descriptions within these 
primary care data, with a 95% confidence interval of 
no greater than 2%, we calculated that a sample size of 
at least 2,043 incident reports was required. From the 
sampling frame of 13,699 reports, we drew a randomly 
selected sample of 2,679 (to accommodate for the 
frequency of duplicates and reports with insufficient 
detail to interpret) using a random number generator.
Study Design
We took a sequential exploratory approach20 based 
on first a qualitative analysis and then a quantitative 
analysis. We conducted a content analysis21 of inci-
dent reports, coding the incident characteristics and 
type of blame attributions, after which we conducted 
a descriptive statistical analysis of the frequency of 
blame categories.
Data Coding
Using the Recursive Model of Incident Analysis,22 we 
coded the free-text descriptions of the incidents using 
the Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) Classification 
System,10 which is aligned with the World Health 
Organization (WHO) International Classification for 
Patient Safety (ICPS).23 We coded the primary inci-
dent type (eg, administration or discharge planning), 
primary contributory factor (eg, staffing levels or 
patient vulnerability), and the severity of the outcome 
(no, low, moderate, or severe harm or death). This 
method has been described in more detail elsewhere.10 
At the analysis stage, we excluded reports that did 
not describe a patient safety incident (for example, 
a patient falling in the clinic parking lot). Reports 
describing pressure ulcers have been excluded in previ-
ous work because they typically describe an outcome 
rather than an incident type. Pressure ulcers, however, 
accounted for more than 1 in 8 reports in the database, 
so we included these as an incident type to ensure the 
sample reflected the way incident reporting is used.10
We coded for blame according to a framework 
derived empirically by our team of primary care 
patient safety experts in conjunction with our lay 
patient and public involvement team. This framework 
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was tested on a pilot sample of reports and amended as 
necessary. One of the study team (J.C.) coded the cat-
egories, and a random sample of 268 (10%) reports was 
double-coded. We discussed discordance, rectified dis-
crepancies, and calculated a κ coefficient to determine 
inter-rater reliability of coding.
Statistical Analysis
We calculated odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals 
of the odds of blame attribution (vs no blame attri-
bution) and performed χ2 tests to assess the associa-
tions between attribution of blame and the following 
prespecified variables: incident type, the number and 
nature of contributory factors reported, and severity of 
harm.10 We integrated the quantitative findings with the 
emerging insights generated from the coding process.
Ethical Approval
The Aneurin Bevan University Health Board (Wales, 
United Kingdom) research risk review committee 
was consulted for ethical approval. As all identifiable 
details were removed before the submission of reports 
to the National Reporting and Learning System, 
ethical approval was waived for analysis of this ano-
nymized data set. To further protect confidentiality, 
we made minor editorial adjustments to any examples 
provided, for example, removal of dates, location, and 
in 1 case, a rare diagnosis.
RESULTS
The 2,679 patient safety incident reports were 
reviewed against the criteria for inclusion. We excluded 
reports that did not describe a patient safety inci-
dent (n = 134) or did not involve primary health care 
(n = 397), leaving 2,148 incident reports for analysis. 
Reports came from a range of 
primary care settings: 1,405 from 
family practice, 644 from com-
munity nursing services, and the 
remainder from dentistry, mental 
health, and pharmacy services.
We defined blame as evidence 
in the free-text of a judgement 
about a deficiency or fault by a 
person or people. Described fail-
ure of aspects of the system rather 
than a person was coded as no 
blame. The remaining incidents 
described human errors leading 
to patient safety incidents. We 
found 5 key categories of blame 
(Figure 1 and Table 1). Blames self 
and blamed by another described 
reports in which the person reporting the incident 
found fault in his own actions and acknowledged per-
sonal responsibility. Blames another and others blaming 
others, on the other hand, reflect reports that were used 
to identify others considered worthy of censure: we call 
this directed blame (Figure 1).
We found an attribution of blame statement in 45% 
(975) of patient safety incident reports (95% CI, 43%-
47%). Cohen’s κ for inter-rater reliability for coding of 
blame was calculated at κ = 0.81 (95% CI, 0.74-0.88), 
indicating strong agreement.24 Table 2 shows that 
where blame was attributed, 92% (894) were cases of 
directed blame, whereas only 2% (41) acknowledged 
personal responsibility.
We found many cases of directed blame, both 
from the person reporting the incident and from other 
reports generated in response to or in anticipation of a 
complaint (Table 2, example 3: blames another).
Table 3 shows that the 3 types of incidents most 
likely to be associated with directed blame were those 
involving discharge planning, communication prob-
lems, and referrals. Incident reports involving record 
keeping and documentation, pressure ulcers, and 
investigations were significantly less likely to contain 
directed blame than other incidents.
Where incident reports described 1 or more con-
tributory factors, 50% (433 of 865) attributed directed 
blame compared with 36% (461 of 1,283) of reports 
without contributory factors. Table 4 shows the ratios 
for the odds of blame for each type of primary con-
tributory factor against the odds of blame in the other 
3 categories.
Severity of harm to the patient, ranging from no 
harm to death, was described in 1,475 incident reports, 
with 44% (653) of these attributing directed blame 
(Table 5).
Figure 1. Types of blame.
Others blaming others
No blameBlamed by another
Blames self
Blames another
Acknowledging 
personal 
responsibility
Unknown blame
Directed blame
Blame
Judgment of de -
ciency or fault by a 
person or people
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DISCUSSION
In almost one-half of incident reports, reports con-
taining a judgment featured fault by a person (975 of 
2,148), and 42% of reports featured directed blame 
(894 of 2,148). The proportion showing directed blame 
varied depending on the incident type, contribu-
tory factors involved, and the severity of harm to the 
patient. Directed blame was less likely in incidents 
where the patient was harmed (except for the small 
category of reports about death).
Fear of being held personally accountable is 
thought to explain much of the reluctance of frontline 
health care staff to use incident reporting systems 
to communicate patient safety concerns.2,5,7, 25-27 
Although blame is acknowledged to hinder reporting,6 
ours is the first study to identify and characterize its 
use within incident reports themselves.
Health service managers have a responsibility, to 
motivate reporting within a blame-free culture28,29; 
further it is difficult to generate learning from reports 
unless health care is free from an atmosphere of 
Table 1. Categories of Blame by Persons Reporting Safety Incidents
Blame Focus and 
Definition Example
Acknowledging personal responsibility
Blames self
Blames himself/herself 
for the incident
“Seen as temporary resident for an inguinal hernia awaiting operation. Was incarcerated (probably) and I acted 
on his history of this being reducible. I should have admitted him there and then and didn’t. No complaint by 
patient.”
Blamed by another
Describes a third party 
blaming him/her for 
the incident
“The patient was diagnosed as having a [rare type of cancer]. He had attended the surgery on and off since [date] 
with urinary symptoms which seemed to respond to antibiotics. He saw every clinical member of the practice 
and was examined but a thorough examination was impossible. He was referred for a possible hernia on [date] 
and to the urology department on [date]. He was seen by both specialties within a week and diagnosis was con-
firmed. There has been a comment made to the family by a consultant that we should have spotted it sooner.”
Directed blame
Blames another
Blames another individ-
ual for the incident
Example 1: “A terminally ill patient attended A&E in possible retention of urine. This patient has a syringe driver in 
situ with morphine and metoclopramide. The syringe driver was clearly labelled as per policy but despite this the 
doctor who saw the patient in A&E took the syringe driver down and left the patient without any analgesia or 
anti-sickness medication. As a result, the patient was in a lot of pain and was only given a small amount of oral 
analgesia after being in A&E for some hours. TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. Medication error/critical incident. Com-
plete lack of knowledge demonstrated by the doctor. Inadequate assessment and lack of knowledge on behalf of 
the doctor, and failure to listen to the patient, as he did question why they were taking the syringe driver down.”
Example 2: “Patient brought to locum GP by mother with 3 / 52 history of symptoms of diabetes. After blood 
tests, she was diagnosed and started on oral hypoglycemic drug. She took one dose only and then was admit-
ted to hospital with blurred vision. Patient was inappropriately treated by GP and not referred promptly.”
Example 3: “Patient’s INR was 8.00 on [date]. Her warfarin was stopped on [date] and nobody has been to check 
her since urgent referral made to primary care trust. Patient left without warfarin cover for 10 days. There is a 
chance that the patient may have had a stroke with an INR of 8. This is a dangerous reading and the patient 
should have been seen earlier. Patient’s daughter is making a formal complaint against the doctors. The paper-
work received is inadequate with no target, no drugs listed, no information on present state.
Others blaming others
Describes another indi-
vidual being blamed 
for the incident
“Patient had an appointment with the doctor. Patient was in discomfort with problems swallowing and indiges-
tion. This lady has complex co-morbidities. After a few days she felt very ill and thought it was the medication 
that had been prescribed on the day of her appointment. The patient contacted the practice but the practice 
would/could not provide an appointment that day or indeed the next day. The doctor eventually agreed to do 
another prescription without seeing her again (stemetil). When the patient went to collect the medication the 
pharmacist would not dispense the medication as it was not suitable for people with under active thyroid and 
it was for vertigo/nausea/vomiting. The patient could not raise this issue since the practice was then closed. The 
patient added that this is not the first time that something has happened like this.”
Unknown blame
Blame identified but 
source unclear
“Patient with rheumatoid arthritis on steroids was taken off bone protection medication for 1 year giving a ‘drug 
free holiday’ to reduce the incidence of atypical fracture (without a review date to re-start). She had been on 
this medication for 7 years. Stopping this medication was inappropriate.”
No blame
No attribution of blame 
to a person
“Computer system misinterpreted the directions for the dose of amiodarone and printed out 1/2 tablet daily 
instead of 1 1/2  stated on the prescription even though the patient’s computer record showed 1 1/2 daily as 
issued.”
A&E = accident and emergency; GP = general practitioner; INR = international normalized ratio.
Table 2. Numbers and Proportions of Blame 
Attribution (N = 2,148 Reports)
Focus of Blame
 Reportsa 
No. (%)
Acknowledges personal responsibility
Blames self 28 (1)
Blamed by another 13 (1)
Directed blame
Blames another 766 (36)
Others blaming others 128 (6)
Unknown blame 40 (2)
No blame 1,173 (55)
a Rounded to the nearest integer.
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blame.2,12,13 That 42% of reports were used to censure 
others, however, suggests progress toward a blame-free 
and supportive culture is slow.
Most safety incidents are caused by a complex 
interaction of individual actions and system failures, 
with greater weight given to system factors.9 Reason’s 
Swiss cheese model describes how, although human 
error is inevitable, incidents are frequently the result 
of multiple smaller errors within a failed system: “The 
important question is not who blundered, but how and 
why the defenses failed.”9
First, we hypothesize that our results may reflect 
the outlook and behavior of those working in a culture 
in which seeking personal accountability for errors is 
placed ahead of identifying the scope 
for learning.6,11 Coles et al30 found that 
hospital clinicians had little confidence 
managers would deal with reports in a 
blame-free way. Hospital managers also 
perceived that incident reports were 
being used by those making the report 
to “cover one’s own back” in the event of 
an incident. Indeed, many directed blame 
reports were generated in response to 
or anticipation of a complaint (Table 1, 
Blames another, example 3).
Second, as Reason explains, humans 
are susceptible to the fundamental attri-
bution error in that they tend to appre-
ciate systems factors in understanding 
one’s own actions but tend focus on 
others’ personal behaviors rather than 
the wider context influencing them.9 
The blames-another example of directed 
blame (Table 1, Blames another, example 
1) lists numerous failures of the physi-
cian involved but provides no insights 
into whether the department was busy 
or the physician had the appropriate 
training or supervision.
Those reporting incidents acknowl-
edged personal responsibility for their 
actions in only 2% of their reports, 
compared with the 42% of reports 
directing blame at others. Although 
the exact proportions may not be gen-
eralizable for all incidents or routine 
practice (because of selection biases in 
the reporting system), this difference is 
substantial and suggests key differences 
and missed learning. We may be missing 
key insights and soft intelligence that 
individuals closest to these incidents 
might have offered.31,32 Soft intelligence 
is insight from experiences of frontline staff about the 
reality of the system, which can thrive only where staff 
feel valued and respected.31,32 Historically, despite its 
potential, analyses of incident reporting have failed to 
provide this soft intelligence or support this ethic.
It is unsurprising that persons reporting incidents 
who identified staff factors contributing to the incident 
were more likely to apportion directed blame than 
where equipment or patient factors were considered 
to be causative. Reports describing organizational 
contributory factors, however, also had higher odds 
of containing directed blame. It is possible that those 
reporting incidents may still make fundamental attribu-
tion errors despite recognizing system factors.
Table 3. Likelihood of Directed Blame Attribution With 
Different Types of Safety Incidents Reported
Incident Type
 Reports 
No.
Reports Containing 
Directed Blame 
No. (%) OR (95% CI)a
Discharge planning 33 27 (82) 6.5 (2.7-15.8)
Communication 36 25 (69) 3.3 (1.6-6.6)
Referral 170 106 (62) 2.5 (1.8-3.5)
Diagnosis and assessment 62 37 (60) 2.1 (1.3-3.6)
Medication 417 228 (54) 1.9 (1.6-2.4)
Administration 379 181 (48) 1.4 (1.1-1.7)
Treatment 77 37 (48) 1.3 (0.8-2.1)
Equipment provision 94 40 (43) 1.0 (0.7-1.6)
Other 68 27 (40) 0.9 (0.6-1.5)
Investigations 251 76 (30) 0.6 (0.4-0.8)
Record keeping and 
documentation
80 19 (24) 0.5 (0.3-0.7)
Vaccination 100 21 (21) 0.4 (0.2-0.6)
Pressure ulcer 381 70 (18) 0.3 (0.2-0.3)
OR = odds ratio.
a ORs for odds of directed blame when incident type is present vs incident type absent.
Table 4. Directed Blame and Contributory Factors in Safety 
Incident Reports
Contributory Factor
Reports 
No.
Directed 
Blame 
No. (%)
OR  
(95% CI)a
Staff factors (eg, staff knowledge, failure  
to follow protocols)
351 203 (58) 1.7 (1.3-2.3)
Organizational factors (eg, staffing level, 
continuity of care)
216 122 (56) 1.4 (1.0-1.9)
Patient factors (eg, frailty, language barrier) 263 100 (38) 0.5 (0.4-0.7)
Equipment factors (eg, faulty or missing 
equipment)
35 8 (29) 0.3 (0.1-0.6)
No contributory factors reported 1,283 461 (36) …
All reports 2,148 894 (42) …
OR = odds ratio. 
a Comparing odds of directed blame where contributory factor is present vs odds of blame where an 
alternative contributory factor is present.
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Directed blame was more likely in situations of dis-
charge planning, communication, referrals and diagno-
sis, and assessment. These types of incidents involved 
clinical judgment and interactions with patients, their 
relatives, and other health care professionals. Perhaps 
the more emotive nature and context of these incidents 
resulted in more frequent directed blame. Furthermore, 
recognizing a diagnostic error may require judgment 
by the person reporting the incident, whereas a pres-
sure ulcer or documentation error is a matter of fact 
and more easily reported as such. Many decisions and 
judgments in primary care are made by individual 
clinicians in practices where there are no checks and 
balances that a larger team provides, as in hospital 
care. Primary care professionals may therefore be more 
individually vulnerable to directed blame than their 
hospital colleagues when an error is made.16
Strengths and Limitations
We used a well-established coding method10 with a 
high level of coding agreement (κ = 0.81) to ensure 
methodological rigor. Our study examined associa-
tions with blame attribution, and we offer new insights 
into the way incident reports are used. Generalizations 
from our study should be made cautiously: selection 
bias in reporting is important,33 rendering this analysis 
essentially inductive rather than deductive; the qual-
ity of incident report analysis relies heavily on the use 
of subjective interpretation of events during reporting 
and the depth of information provided by the those 
reporting the incidents.34 Also, persons reporting 
incidents may not necessarily have all the informa-
tion at the time of writing. Further research should 
explore how persons reporting incidents are affected 
by social and cultural influences, as well as by their the 
motivations and understanding of the potential impact 
of blame. Such explorations, as well as a comparative 
analysis of blame in secondary care incident reporting, 
would enable the effective targeting of interventions to 
improve the learning from these reports.
Leaders and managers of health care systems and 
health organizations are frequently urged to develop 
and promote a climate of learning from things that go 
wrong. It seems that their current approach, however, 
may drive their staff to point the finger at their col-
leagues. This amplification of the process of seeking 
someone to blame is neither in the interests of patients, 
nor staff, nor of making health care safer.
To read or post commentaries in response to this article, see it 
online at http://www.AnnFamMed.org/content/15/5/455.
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